martedì 13 settembre 2016


Innanzitutto partiamo da un dato semplice semplice, vale a dire il TARGET2. 
Cosa ci dice? Ci dice che le risorse generate dal QE, versante Italia, non vengono impiegate nel nostro Paese ma scappano all' estero e che, più in generale, i capitali anziché andare dai paesi "core" verso le "periferie" stanno percorrendo il tragitto opposto. 
Quello sotto è invece un grafico che mette in evidenza l' espansione del bilancio della BCE e l'andamento delle aspettative sull' inflazione. 
Allo stato attuale, dimensione del bilancio (la cui espansione è legata all'implementazione delle politiche monetarie varate da Draghi) ed aspettative sull'inflazione sembrano inversamente correlate: più aumenta la prima, più si riducono le seconde. 

In tal senso,  perculando i giapponesi senza sapere che avrebbe poi fatto la stessa cosa della BOJ, dichiarava Bernanke nel 2008: «[..] The second general approach to conducting non traditional monetary policy is by use of the balance sheet. We have already begun to do this to some extent, as you know. In some respects our policies are similar to the quantitative easing of the Japanese, but I would argue that, when you look at it more carefully, what we’re doing is fundamentally different from the Japanese approach. Let me talk about that a bit. The Japanese approach, the quantitative easing approach, was focused on the liability side of the balance sheet—specifically the quantity of bank reserves, the monetary base, or however you want to put it, in the system. The theory behind quantitative easing was that providing enormous amounts of very cheap liquidity to banks, as Steve discussed, would encourage them to lend and that lending, in turn, would increase the broader measures of the money supply, which in turn would raise prices and stimulate asset prices, and so on, and that would suffice to stimulate the economy. Again, the focus of the quantitative easing was on the liability side, and indeed, there were targets, as you know, for the amount of excess reserves or reserves in the system. I think that the verdict on quantitative easing is fairly negative. It didn’t seem to have a great deal of effect, mostly because banks would not lend out the reserves that they were holding. The one thing that it did seem to do was affect expectations of policy rates because everyone understood it would take some time to unwind the quantitative easing. Therefore, that pushed out into the future the increase in the policy rate.[..]».
Ben continuava poi a deridere i Giapponesi dicendo: 
«So I would argue that what we are doing is different from quantitative easing because, unlike the Japanese focus on the liability side of the balance sheet, we are focused on the asset side of the balance sheet. In particular, we have adopted a series of programs, all of which involve some type of lending or asset purchase, which has brought onto our balance sheet securities other than the typical Treasuries that we usually transact in. You are all aware of the lending facilities for banks and dealers, the swaps with foreign central banks, the promised purchases of MBS, the various credit facilities for which even I do not know all the acronyms anymore. [Laughter] In this case, rather than being a target of policy, the quantity of excess reserves in the system is a byproduct of the decisions to make these various types of credit available. I think that’s a very different strategy, and Bill gave some evidence—we can debate it further—that these different policies have had some effects on the markets at which they’re aimed. [..]».
L'attenzione all' asset side anziché alla liability side ha consentito un rialzo dei tassi di ben 25 pb in 7 anni! Me cojoni! 
E la Yellen cosa diceva a proposito di QE?  «[..] While the quantity of money is surely linked to the price level in the very long run, most evidence suggests that variations in the base have only insignificant economic effects in the short or medium term under liquidity trap conditions. This makes the base an inappropriate operating instrument for monetary policy in a zero bound regime. As Japan found during its quantitative easing program, increasing the size of the monetary base above levels needed to provide ample liquidity to the banking system had no discernible economic effects aside from those associated with communicating the Bank of Japan’s commitment to the zero interest rate policy[..]».
Draghi avrebbe potuto leggere, a suo tempo, le 4 righe di cui sopra e risparmiarsi tempo, fatica ed annessa bolla sui titoli di stato europei.
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